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Based on a quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol [Phys. Rev. A69(04)052319],
we propose a (n, n)-threshold scheme of multiparty quantum secret sharing of classical messages
(QSSCM) using only single photons. We take advantage of this multiparty QSSCM scheme
to establish a scheme of multiparty secret sharing of quantum information (SSQI), in which
only all quantum information receivers collaborate can the original qubit be reconstructed. A
general idea is also proposed for constructing multiparty SSQI schemes from any QSSCM scheme.
PACS: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ta, 89.70.+c
Suppose Alice wants to send a secret message to two distant parties, Bob and Charlie. One of them,
Bob or Charlie, is not entirely trusted by Alice. And she knows that if the two guys coexist, the honest
one will keep the dishonest one from doing any damages. Instead of giving the total secret messages
to any one of them, it may be desirable for Alice to split the secret messages into two encrypted parts
and send each one a part so that no one alone is sufficient to obtain the whole original information but
they collaborate. To gain this end classical cryptography can use a technique called as secret sharing
[1,2], where secret messages are distributed among n users in such a way that only by combining their
pieces of information can the n users recover the secret messages. Usually this kind of protocols are
divided into classes, where from the n receivers, m can collaborate to produce the desired result. In
this paper, we will focus on a (n, n) scheme, where all the receivers need to collaborate to obtain the
desired message.
Recently this concept has been generalized to a quantum scenario [3]. The quantum secret sharing
(QSS) is likely to play a key role in protecting secret quantum information, e.g., in secure operations
of distributed quantum computation, sharing difficult-to-construct ancilla states and joint sharing of
quantum money [6], and so on. Hence, after the pioneering QSS work proposed by using three-particle
and four-particle GHZ states [3], this kind of works on QSS attracted a great deal of attentions in
both theoretical and experimental aspects [4-16]. All these works [3-16] can be divided into two kinds,
one only deals with the QSS of classical messages (i.e., bits)[5-6,8-11,13-14], or only deals with the
QSS of quantum information [4,7,12,15-16] where the secret is an arbitrary unknown state in a qubit;
and the other [3] studies both, that is, deals with QSS of classical messages and QSS of quantum
information simultaneously. In all those schemes [3,5-6,8-11,13-14] dealing with the QSS of classical
messages (bits), entangled states are used with only an exception [13] where multi-particle product
2states are employed. On the other hand, in all those schemes [3,4,7,12,15,16] dealing with the QSS of
quantum information, multi-particle entangled states are used.
Recently, a particular quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol has been proposed by
Deng and Long [17], in which only single photon state is used. In this paper, based on Deng-Long’s
QSDC protocol, we propose a scheme of multiparty quantum secret sharing of classical messages
(QSSCM) by using only single photons. And then we take advantage of this multiparty QSSCM
scheme to establish a scheme of multiparty secret sharing of quantum information (SSQI), where the
secret is an arbitrary unknown quantum state in a qubit. We will show that multi-particle entangled
states are unnecessary in our multiparty SSQI scheme. Finally, we will propose a general idea for
constructing multiparty SSQI schemes from any QSSCM scheme.
Now let us turn to our multiparty QSSCM scheme. For convenience, let us first describe a three-
party QSSCM scheme. Suppose Alice wants to send a secret message to two distant parties, Bob
and Charlie. One of them, Bob or Charlie, is not entirely trusted by Alice, and she knows that if
the two guys coexist, the honest one will keep the dishonest one from doing any damages. The two
receivers, Bob and Charlie, can infer the secret message only by their mutual assistance. Our following
three-party QSSCM scheme can achieve this goal with 5 steps.
(a) Bob prepares a batch of N single photons randomly in one of four polarization states |H〉 = |0〉,
|V 〉 = |1〉, |u〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 + |1〉), |d〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉). For convenience, {|H〉,|V 〉} is refereed to as
the rectilinear basis and {|u〉,|d〉} the diagonal basis hereafter. Then he sends this batch of photons
to Charlie.
(b) After receiving these photons, for each photon Charlie randomly choose a unitary operation
from I, U and UH and performs this unitary operation on it. Here I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| is an identity
operator, U = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| and UH = (|0〉〈0| + |1〉〈0| + |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈1|)/
√
2 is a Hadamard gate
operator. The nice feature of the U operation is that it flips the state in both measuring bases, i.e.,
U |0〉 = −|1〉, U |1〉 = |0〉, U |u〉 = |d〉, U |d〉 = −|u〉. And the nice feature of H is that it can realize the
transformation between the rectilinear basis and the diagonal basis, i.e., UH |H〉 = |u〉, UH |V 〉 = |d〉,
UH |u〉 = |H〉, UH |d〉 = |V 〉. After his encryptions, he sends the photons to Alice. The purpose of
choosing a set of three unitary operations is to protect the channel between Alice and Charlie from
Bob’s interception. For example, if Charlie chooses randomly a unitary operation from only I and U ,
Bob could intercept the channel between Alice and Charlie. He already has all the information about
the state of the photon, and can readily check what is the transformation Alice did, so then he can
retrieve the complete message without the help of Charlie.
(c) Alice stores most of the single photons and selects randomly a subset of single photons. Alice
publicly announces the position of the selected photons. For each selected photon Alice randomly
selects one action from the following two choices. One is that Alice lets Bob first tell her the initial
state of the photon and then lets Charlie tell her which unitary operation he has performed on it;
the other is that Charlie first tells Alice which unitary operation he has performed on the photon
and then Bob tells Alice the initial state of the photon. Alice’s strategy of choosing two actions is
to prevent either Bob’s or Charlie’s intercept-resend attacks. Then Alice first performs the same
unitary operation as Charlie has performed on the photon and then measures the photon by using the
3basis the initial state belongs to. After her measurements, Alice can determine the error rate. If the
error rate exceeds the threshold, the process is aborted. Otherwise, the process continues and Alice
performs unitary operations (either I or U) on the stored photons to encode her secret messages.
That is, if Alice wants to encode a bit ’0’, she performs the identity unitary operation I; if Alice
wants to encode a bit ’1’, she performs the unitary operation U = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. Alice sends these
encoded photons to Charlie.
(d) After Charlie receives these encoded photons, if Bob and Charlie collaborate, both Bob and
Charlie can obtain Alice’s secret message by using correct measuring basis for each encoded photon.
On the other hand, if Bob and Charlie do not collaborate, then both Bob and Charlie can not get
access to Alice’s secret message with 100% certainty.
(e) Alice publicly announces a small part of her secret messages for Bob and Charlie to check
whether the photons travelling from Alice site to Charlie’s site have been attacked, which is called
message authentification. If the photons are attacked, the eavesdropper Eve can not get access to any
useful information but interrupt the transmissions.
So far we have proposed the three-party QSSCM scheme based on Deng and Long’s QSDC protocol
[17] by using single photons. The security of the present three-party QSSCM scheme is the same as
the security of Deng and Long’s QSDC protocol [17], that is, it depends completely on the step when
Charlie sends the photon batch to Alice. As proven in [17], the scheme is also unconditionally secure.
Incidentally, one can easily find that if Alice sends the encoded photons to Bob instead of Charlie,
then the resultant scheme works securely also.
Now let us generalize the three-party QSSCM scheme to a n-party (n ≥ 4) QSSCM scheme. Suppose
that Alice is the message sender who would like to send a massage to Bob, Charlie, Dick, . . . , and
Zach (there is totally n receivers). The first step of the n-party (n ≥ 4) QSSCM scheme is the same
as that in the three-party QSSCM scheme. For completeness, this step is also included as follows.
(I) Bob prepares a batch of N single photons randomly in one of four polarization states |H〉 = |0〉,
|V 〉 = |1〉, |u〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 + |1〉), |d〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉). Then he sends this batch of photons to
Charlie.
(II) After receiving these photons, for each photon Charlie randomly chooses a unitary operation
from I, U and UH and performs this unitary operation on it. After his encryptions, he sends the
encrypted photons to the next receiver, say, Dick. Dick encrypts randomly the encoded photons in the
same way as Charlie, then he sends the photons to the next receiver, and so on. Similar procedure is
repeated until Zach finishes his encryptions. After Zach’s encryptions, he sends the encrypted photons
to Alice.
(III) Alice stores most of the single photons and selects randomly a subset of single photons. And
then Alice publicly announces the position of the selected photons. To prevent any receiver’s intercept-
resend attack, for each selected photon, Alice randomly selects a receiver one by one and let him or
her tell her this receiver’s message till she obtains all receivers’s messages. Here Bob’s message is the
initial state of the photon, while Charlie’s, (Dick’s, . . . , Zeck ’s) message is which unitary operation
he has performed on the photon. Alice performs in turn the same unitary operations as Zeck’s, the
(n−2)th receiver’s, . . . , Dick’s and Charlie’s unitary operations on the photon and then measures this
4photon by using the basis the initial state belongs to. After her measurements, Alice can determine
the error rate. If the error rate exceeds the threshold, the process is aborted. Otherwise, the process
continues and Alice performs unitary operations (either I or U) on the stored photons to encode her
secret messages. Alice sends these encoded photons to Zach.
(IV) After Zach receives these encoded photons, if Zach and the other n−1 receivers (Bob, Charlie,
Dick, . . . , the (n− 1)th receiver) collaborate, they can obtain Alice’s secret message by using correct
measuring basis for each encoded photon. On the other hand, if all the receivers do not collaborate,
then none of them can get access to Alice’s secret message with 100% certainty.
(V) Alice publicly announces a small part of her secret messages for all the receivers to check
whether the photons travelling from Alice site to Zach’s site have been attacked, which is called
message authentification. If the photons are attacked, the eavesdropper Eve can not get access to any
useful information but interrupt the transmissions.
So far we have established a n-party QSSCM scheme by using single photons. The security of the
present n-party QSSCM scheme is the same as the security of three-party QSSCM scheme, which is
also unconditionally secure. Incidentally, as mentioned previously, one can easily find that if Alice
sends the encoded photons to any other receiver instead of Zach, then the resultant scheme works
securely also.
Now let us move to propose a multiparty SSQI scheme. Before this, let us briefly review the
secure teleportation of an unknown quantum state [19]. Suppose that Alice wants to send to Bob
an unknown state α|H〉u + β|V 〉u in her qubit. Bob prepares a photon pair in any Bell state, say,
|Φ+〉ht = 1√
2
(|H〉h|H〉t + |V 〉h|V 〉t = 1√
2
(|u〉h|u〉t + |d〉h|d〉t). Bob sends the t photon to Alice. By
randomly selecting one of the two sets of measuring basis, both Alice and Bob can check whether
the quantum channel for photon transmission is attacked or not according to their joint actions [24].
Suppose the quantum channel is safe and Bob successfully transits a t photon to Alice. The state of
the whole system can be rewritten as
(α|H〉u + β|V 〉u)|Φ+〉ht = (α|H〉u + β|V 〉u) 1√
2
(|H〉h|H〉t + |V 〉h|V 〉t
=
1
2
|Φ+〉ut((α|H〉h + β|V 〉h) + 1
2
|Ψ+〉ut((α|V 〉h + β|H〉h)
+
1
2
|Φ−〉ut((α|H〉h − β|V 〉h) + 1
2
|Ψ−〉ut((α|V 〉h − β|H〉h), (1)
where |Ψ+〉 = (|H〉h|V 〉t+ |V 〉h|H〉t)/
√
2, |Ψ−〉 = (|H〉h|V 〉t−|V 〉h|H〉t)/
√
2 and |Φ−〉 = (|H〉h|H〉t−
|V 〉h|V 〉t)/
√
2. Hence, if Alice performs a Bell-state measurement on the two photons in her lab and
tells Bob her measurement outcome, say, |Φ+〉 (|Ψ+〉,|Ψ−〉,|Φ−〉), then Bob can perform a unitary
operation I = |H〉〈H |+ |V 〉〈V | (u1 = |H〉〈V |+ |V 〉〈H |, u2 = |H〉〈H |− |V 〉〈V |, u3 = |H〉〈V |− |V 〉〈H |)
to reconstruct the unknown state in the qubit h. Since the teleportation is based on EPR pairs, so
the proof of the security is the same in essence as those in Ref.[20-24]. This is the secure teleportation
of an unknown state in a qubit. In such teleportation, Alice’s public announcement of the Bell-state
measurement outcome is a necessary step, otherwise, Bob can not reconstruct the unknown state in
his retained qubit.
Our multiparty SSQI scheme (n ≥ 3) is almost the same as the secure teleportation of an unknown
5quantum state as mentioned above, except one point. Alice would like to send an unknown quantum
state to Bob, Charlie, Dick, . . . , and Zach (there is totally n receivers). To do this, she sends the
unknown quantum state to Bob by teleportation. But instead of public announcement of the Bell-
state measurement outcome, Alice distributes her Bell-state measurement outcome to n-1 receivers
without Bob by use of the QSSCM (quantum secret sharing of classical messages) protocol we just
proposed. To reconstruct an unknown state in a qubit, all n receivers must collaborate.
In our multiparty SSQI (secret sharing of quantum information) scheme, the multi-particle GHZ
states in all other existing multiparty SSQI schemes [3,4,7] are not necessary. Although in [15] it is
claimed that only Bell states are needed, the identification of multi-particle GHZ state is necessary.
In our multiparty SSQI protocol, only during the teleportation step are the use and identification of
Bell states needed. In all other steps, single photon states are enough. Hence, the present multiparty
SSQI scheme is more feasible with present-day technique[25].
As a matter of fact, till now there have been many existing multiparty QSSCM (quantum secret
sharing of classical messages) schemes [3,5-6,8-11,13-14]. Each of them can be combined with the
secure quantum teleportation of an unknown state to establish a multiparty SSQI scheme. Hence the
idea of combining a secure teleportation of an unknown state with a QSSCM scheme to set up a SSQI
scheme in the present paper is a general one.
To summarize, in this paper by using single photon state instead of entangled states (Bell states or
multi-particle GHZ states) or of multi-photon product states we have presented a multiparty QSSCM
scheme based on Deng and Long’s QSDC protocol. We have also proposed a multiparty SSQI scheme
by taking advantage of our multiparty QSSCM scheme. The idea of combining a multiparty QSSCM
scheme with the secure quantum teleportation to establish a multiparty SSQI scheme is general.
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